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Dr. Neal DeRoo is Associate Professor of Philosophy at 
Dordt College, and Fellow of the Andreas Center for 
Reformed Scholarship and Service.
From Defending Theism 
to Discerning Spirits: 
Reconceiving the Task of 
Christian Philosophy
by Neal DeRoo
In his “Advice to Christian Philosophers”1 Al-
vin Plantinga lays out two pressing tasks for phi-
losophy: systematizing, deepening, and clarifying 
Christian thought on key philosophical topics 
(16) and exploring how the result of such clarifi-
cation bears on the rest of what we think and do 
(18). These tasks are necessary because philosophy 
provides “an arena for the articulation and inter-
play of commitments and allegiances fundamen-
tally religious in nature; it is an expression of deep 
and fundamental perspectives, ways of viewing 
ourselves and the world and God” (18). In this 
paper I will argue that philosophy is not only 
an arena in which these deep commitments play 
out and are systematically clarified but also a key 
method by which those commitments are brought 
to intellectual light in the first place. In this regard, 
philosophy is not just about examining and under-
standing theistic beliefs and their relation to our 
other thoughts and actions; rather, it is the means 
by which we discern the spirits of our time.
Spirits of the Age?
If this recourse to spirits seems too mystical—or, 
perhaps even worse, too Hegelian—to be included 
in meaningful rational discourse, that is an issue 
you will have to take up with Prof. Plantinga him-
self. For it is he who uses this language to describe 
the urgency of the task of Christian philosophy: 
“Most of the so-called human sciences, much of 
the non-human sciences, most of non-scientific in-
tellectual endeavor and even a good bit of allegedly 
Christian theology is animated by a spirit wholly 
foreign to that of Christian theism” (3; emphasis 
added). It is highly unlikely that we are to think of 
this animation by a spirit along the lines of super-
natural possession, as if a distinct immaterial en-
tity somehow occupies and controls the scientific 
enterprise. But if it’s not Casper the un-friendly 
ghost, then what are we dealing with here?
Generally, we tend to speak of a spirit of the age 
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humanity is not an image-bearer in the sense of 
exhibiting a similar property in a similar way to 
God.2 Indeed, being an image-bearer of God is not 
a property of humanity at all but is rather its es-
sential definition: humanity is image-bearing-ness 
itself and not merely a thing that happens, acci-
dentally, to bear the image of God. That is to say, 
bearing God’s image to creation is not a part of 
human activity, but it is, in fact, the totality of it: 
everything that humanity does bears the imprint 
of the God who created it—or the image of some-
thing else functioning as if it were God.
An anthropology that seeks to systematize this 
understanding of humanity as image-bearers was 
sketched out by Herman Dooyeweerd and elabo-
rated by some of his followers (notably James H. 
Olthuis3). Central to this anthropology is the no-
tion of the heart as the spiritual center and integral 
whole of humankind, the center from which the 
entirety of human living flows. A key metaphor 
in understanding this notion of the heart is that 
of light shining through a prism: just as light is a 
solid beam of white light on one side of the prism 
but is refracted into the many colors of the rain-
bow on the other side of the prism, so too, the 
heart is like a prism through which the creative 
spirit of God shines and is refracted, in temporal 
(creaturely) life, as all the various types of crea-
turely inter-action. On one side of the heart is the 
unrefracted spirit of God, and on the other (tem-
poral) side of the heart are the multiple aspects of 
human existence, which are nothing but the spirit 
of God refracted and expressed in particular tem-
poral circumstances. The heart is therefore not a 
part of the human being, but it is rather the es-
sential condition of humanity: we do not have a 
heart: we are heart-ed. As heart-ed creatures, we 
cannot help but reflect some type of spirit in all 
that we do, since it is our very natures to do so. All 
of human action is a refraction of the spirit flowing 
through our hearts. 
On this anthropology, humanity is essentially 
spiritual, insofar as everything we do is a refraction 
of the spirit flowing through the human heart. This 
spirit is picked up from, and is expressed within, 
creation. Because the spirit is expressed through 
every human action, other creatures can pick up 
that spirit from human actions. Human action 
as analogous to a certain cultural mood, a felt dis-
position that leads in certain directions and away 
from other directions. Hence, we can speak of the 
“spirit of 1968” as a certain felt disposition, wide-
spread during the late 1960s, toward free love and 
away from power hierarchies and inter-personal 
violence. If we work with this definition of spirit, 
then a non-theistic spirit animating the scientific 
enterprise would mean that there is a certain felt 
disposition, widespread among participants in the 
scientific enterprise, that moves those participants 
away from theistic thoughts and conclusions. 
And how would such a spirit become known 
and articulated? Plantinga does not elaborate this 
point, but he also claims that he doesn’t have to, 
since “it is familiar to you all” (3). This sense of 
familiarity is perhaps bred from the proximity of 
philosophers to the environs in which this spirit is 
wide-spread. Because the spirit is a felt disposition, 
it is plausible to assume that those who live and 
operate in the environs where that spirit is widely 
spread would themselves feel that spirit, either di-
rectly or via its effects. But precisely because it is 
a felt disposition, it is not clear how such a spirit 
could have an impact on the theoretical commit-
ments and presuppositions of those it affects. Even 
more, if such a spirit is a felt disposition, how could 
we speak of it as animating theology (or any other 
theoretical discipline), which is clearly not capable 
of being the subject of feelings or of possessing dis-
positions?
A Spirit-ual Anthropology
To better understand this notion of a spirit that 
animates the scientific enterprise, I think we need 
to clarify the philosophical anthropology with 
which we are operating. In doing so, I will take 
Professor Plantinga’s advice and offer a distinctly 
Christian anthropology that is fully committed to 
the belief that humanity has been created in the 
image of God (12). In this view we will come to 
see a slightly different account of spirits at work, 
one that will open up for us a new (or at least clari-
fied) task for Christian philosophy.
This account of anthropology begins with the 
assumption of a radical distinction between Cre-
ator and creature, such that the latter can never 
be a miniaturized version of the former. As such, 
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Indeed, being an image-bearer 
of God is not a property of 
humanity at all but is rather its 
essential definition: humanity is 
image-bearing-ness itself and not 
merely a thing that happens, 
accidentally, to bear the image 
of God.
functions as a transmitter that spreads that spirit to 
other creatures. As creatures ourselves, we humans 
also receive the spirit expressed in the work of oth-
er humans; because we are uniquely image-bearing 
creatures, all human action is driven and animated 
by a spirit of this type. Through all of our actions, 
then, humans not only express the spirit that is at 
work in their heart but also receive the spirit that is 
to be expressed. Other people’s expressions of the 
spirit become the fodder for our own expressions 
of the spirit, and vice versa. The spirit is therefore 
an essentially communal endeavor, insofar as it is 
received and expressed in the interaction among 
human beings. 
This communal spirit is therefore an affective 
force which may or may not be a distinct entity. As 
an affective force, it drives (or animates) a course 
of human action but is not expressed solely in one 
or another element of human living. Rather, the 
spiritual driving force is expressed in all the colors 
of the rainbow,4 each of which is a distinct color 
that yet remains necessarily integrally connected 
to the other colors (since they are all expressions 
of one and the same beam of light). Any act of 
theoretical thought, then, is an action that betrays 
multiple modes of relating (logical, historical/for-
mative, linguistic, social, etc.), each of which is ex-
pressive of the spirit that animates the community 
producing that scholarship. As such, no theoreti-
cal thought is spiritually neutral; instead, all theo-
retical thought is, by dint of being the product of 
human action, essentially expressive of a spiritual 
force that drives it. 
Discerning the Spirit(s)
This anthropology has the virtue (at least in this 
gathering) of lending credence to Professor Plant-
inga’s claims that Christian philosophers need be 
no more apologetic of their own spiritual starting 
point than are philosophers whose work expresses 
a different spirit (humanist, materialist, etc.), as 
well as his claims that Christian philosophers are 
responsible first to the Christian community and 
only secondarily to the philosophical one. This an-
thropology also helps us understand more clearly 
what it might mean for a spirit to animate human 
actions and institutions (such as the scientific en-
terprise and/or the institution of academic theol-
ogy). While its implications on this score might 
raise some questions about certain elements of the 
anthropology that Plantinga lays out in “Advice 
to Christian Philosopers,” especially pertaining to 
voluntaristic free will and agent causation, here I 
will focus on what this anthropology tells us about 
the relation between animating spirits and human 
action and how it helps us re-think the task of 
Christian philosophy.
We have already established that this anthro-
pology suggests that all human actions are ex-
pressive of a spirit that is at work in the human 
heart, the spiritual, integral core of human exis-
tence. This spirit is communal rather than indi-
vidual—it is expressed in, and received from, hu-
man interaction with other creatures (especially 
other humans). As the spirit is communal, certain 
communities will have a consistent spiritual vision 
vis-à-vis other communities, insofar as different 
spirits are animating each.5 While these different 
spirits will be expressed in different ways through 
concrete human actions, there is no guarantee that 
the spirits themselves are rationally or consciously 
known to the people within the communities they 
are animating. That is to say, because these spirits 
work directly on the heart, they work on a regis-
ter that is pre-rational (and pre- everything else, 
too, for that matter) and so may work in a way 
that is totally unavowed to those expressing that 
spirit: While I cannot help but express the spirit 
at work in the heart, there is no guarantee that I 
realize I am doing so. And because these spirits are 
so integral to human living, their influence is mas-
sive, whether we realize this or not. And because 
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it is so massive, we might like the opportunity to 
think more carefully about the spirits animating 
us and our communities, both to determine what 
spirits drive us and whether we are all right with 
that spirit or not. What is required, then, is a way 
of distilling (or discerning) from human actions 
the spirit(s) that animate or propel those actions. 
Indeed, such a discerning of spirits is a primary 
religious and spiritual task, insofar as these spirits 
determine the religious and spiritual direction of 
a community.
I would like to argue here that philosophy has 
a unique role to play in this discerning process. 
Where each discipline is tasked with investigating 
a particular aspect of creation (or, rather, is tasked 
with investigating creation from the viewpoint of a 
particular aspect: biological, linguistic, psychologi-
cal, etc.), philosophy is tasked with investigating 
the integrity of creation: how do the different as-
pects and different disciplines hang together? Phil-
osophical conceptions of ontology, anthropology, 
and epistemology deal with these larger questions 
and so are in a unique position to determine the 
larger forces operating within and upon multiple 
disciplines, multiple aspects (though these concep-
tions themselves will bear the mark of the spirit 
that animates them). In addition, the self-reflec-
tive, wisdom-seeking elements of philo-sophia, as 
opposed to merely the more specialized, techni-
cal elements of academic philosophy, also move 
in the direction of articulating the spiritual forces 
that animate the human world. Something similar 
to this impulse seems to already be on Professor 
Plantinga’s radar when he describes philosophy 
as an arena for the “articulation … of commit-
ments…fundamentally religious in nature” (18). 
What I am suggesting here is to take this definition 
of philosophy a step further, as that which pertains 
to the very driving forces of cultural life itself. Phi-
losophy is not merely one arena, one discipline, 
among many in which these spiritual forces can be 
articulated (though it is certainly that, too), and 
its articulations are not limited merely to rational 
or theoretical claims, to ideas; rather, philosophy 
is a unique tool in the discernment, articulation, 
and elaboration of the spirits that animate human 
endeavors, be they the spirit of God or the spirits 
of the age. This particular philosophical task might 
be one that is apparent only to Christian philoso-
phers (though I don’t think this is the case6), but 
Professor Plantinga would be the first to concede 
that that alone does not make it any less pressing a 
philosophical problem. As Christian philosophers, 
we need not let our conception of philosophy, its 
tasks and problems, be defined by the broader 
academy.
A Final Suggestion
Before I proceed further, let me offer a word of 
caution: that I want to add discerning the spirits 
of our age as a task of Christian philosophy does 
not imply that I want to abandon the other tasks 
of (Christian) philosophy laid out by Professor 
Plantinga. There is still a need for philosophy to 
be academically rigorous; to systematize, deepen, 
and clarify Christian thought; and to explore how 
the result of such clarification bears on the rest of 
what we think and do (18). That is, even as it is 
tasked with discerning the spirits of the age, phi-
losophy must remain a theoretical and academic 
venture. But the academic venture of philosophy 
must, ultimately, be in the service of the pursuit of 
the wisdom that requires a discerning of the spirits 
that animate us, whether that be the spirit of God 
(“The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wis-
dom”) or of something else. This is not to say that 
all Christian philosophers must be so-called popu-
larizers, but merely that the results of Christian 
philosophizing ought to be helpful beyond merely 
academic borders.
In that light, I would like to offer an explor-
atory hypothesis, a tentative suggestion: Christian 
philosophy would benefit greatly from using the 
resources of phenomenology in its pursuit of its 
task. Phenomenology offers two distinct elements 
of methodology that make it a beneficial addi-
tion to the Christian philosophical toolbox: first, 
it elaborates the life-world, that is, the world of 
everyday human experience, by recourse to the 
promises already inherent in that life-world and so 
takes that world on its own terms while further 
clarifying, deepening, and understanding those 
terms; and second, it uses both synthesis and ana-
lyticity in service of integrality, which again points 
to its orientation to the world of everyday human 
experience. Both of these elements helpfully serve 
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served in the service of a broader integrality that is 
not merely synthetic but spiritual. This notion of 
integrality is central to the heart-ed anthropology 
laid out here, and I think phenomenology offers 
a methodology that can respect that integrality 
without losing the necessity of analytic rigor, clari-
fication, and articulation. 
Much too briefly, then, I suggest that phenom-
enology might be key to any attempt to achieve 
the discerning task of Christian philosophy. While 
phenomenology may not be alone in its promis-
sory and integral methodology, I think we would 
be re-miss to ignore its literature and methodology 
as we pursue further what it means to be Christian 
philosophers in the 21st century.
Endnotes 
1. Accessed February 2014 from http://www.calvin.edu/
academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plant-
inga_alvin/advice_to_christian_philosophers.pdf; pp. 
1-19. In text citations are to this work, unless otherwise 
cited. The article was originally published in Faith and 
Philosophy 1:3 (1984), 253-271.
2. This idea seems to go against Plantinga’s claims on 
page 12 of “Advice to Christian Philosophers.”
3. The account presented here draws on Olthuis, “Be(com)
ing: Humankind as Gift and Call,” Philosophia 
Reformata 58 (1993), 153-72.
4. Dooyeweerd enumerates them as the mathematical, 
spatial, kinematic, physical, biological, sensitive, logi-
cal, historical (formative), lingual, social, economic, 
aesthetic, judicial, ethical, and the pistic (faith).
5. Or that a similar spirit is being animated differently, 
but pursuing this topic would take us too far afield for 
our purposes here.
6. See, for example, Husserl’s Crisis of the European 
Sciences.
the tasks of Christian philosophy—the discerning 
of the spirits of the age and the systematic clarifica-
tion of those spirits and their influence on human 
thought and action.
The notion of phenomenology as a promis-
sory discipline—the discipline concerned with 
the articulation and elaboration of promises—is 
an attempt to find the coherence among think-
ers as diverse as Husserl and Marion, Heidegger 
and Dastur, and Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Francois 
Courtine. Its basic claim is that phenomenology 
investigates a matter (a Sache rather than a Ding) 
according to what that matter says about itself, im-
plicitly or explicitly, and what the role that matter 
plays in our broader social (inter-personal) world 
says about it. A phenomenology of music, for ex-
ample, is interested both in what music claims 
to be and to do (again, implicitly and explicitly) 
and what role music plays in human living (how 
it relates to other matters within and transcending 
the human subject). Matters are both self-given 
and externally constituted, and both of these ele-
ments must be examined if a matter is to be prop-
erly understood. In looking at what a matter says 
about itself, phenomenology seeks to determine 
what promise is being made within that matter by 
that matter itself; in looking at the role the matter 
plays in our broader social world, phenomenology 
seeks to determine how well the matter is living 
up to its own inherent promise. Crucial here is 
that phenomenology seeks to balance what is true 
of the matters themselves (so as to avoid extreme 
idealism, nominalism, and relativism) and what is 
contextually determined about the matters them-
selves (so as to avoid naïve realism, essentialism, 
and absolutism). This balance is key to properly 
understanding the relationship between the spirit 
and the actions that are expressions of that spirit.
Part and parcel of this balance is its constant 
recourse to the broader picture of the world of na-
ïve, pre-theoretical experience—the life-world, the 
world in which we live. In service of this broader 
picture, phenomenology seeks to balance the ana-
lyticity necessary to understand the parts with the 
synthesis necessary to relate them to the whole. As 
phenomenology does both, analytic rigor is pre-
As heart-ed creatures, we 
cannot help but reflect some 
type of spirit in all that we do, 
since it is our very natures to 
do so.
